140

Whaples
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONNAIRE ON AMERICAN ECONOMIC HISTORY
The top row of numbers next to each question gives the percentage distribution of responses by economists. The second row gives the percentage distribution of responses by historians. E= economists H= historians A = generally agree P = agree-but with provisos D = generally disagree Pr = confidence level with which one can reject the equality of the distribution of the two groups' answers, using the Likelihood Ratio Chi-square statistic, followed by the confidence level with which one can reject the equality of the percent who disagree with the proposition, using a pooled variance t-test. % = percent of economists who answered the question, followed by percent of historians who answered. between EHA members in history departments and members in economics departments.
COLONIAL ECONOMY
Three disparate questions deal with the colonial economy. There is an overwhelming consensus that Americans' economic standard of living on the eve of the Revolution was among the highest in the world. Likewise, a vast majority accept the view that indentured servitude was an economic arrangement designed to iron out imperfections in the capital market. Neither of the statements has generated heated discussion recently in light of the well-known works by Alice Hanson Jones and David Galenson.2 The third colonial era topic has been the subject of much argument. New Left historians, such as James Henretta, have laid out the case that many eighteenth-century farmers in the northern colonies were "isolated" from the market. Winifred Rothenberg has spent considerable effort attempting to refute this idea and seems to have succeeded.3 61 percent of economists and 71 percent of historians in the sample disagree with the characterization of these farmers as "isolated from the market." Among those who agree, only a handful do so wholeheartedly-most would add provisos to the statement.
of the respondents disagree with a proposition, this will be called a "consensus" against the statement. If one-third or less disagree, this will be referred to as a "consensus" in favor of the proposition. 2 Jones, Wealth; and Galenson, "Rise and Fall." I Henretta, "Families and Farms"; and Rothenberg, "Market."
ECONOMIC CAUSES OF THE REVOLUTION AND CONSTITUTION MAKING
Four of the questions deal with the causes of the American Revolution. There is a consensus on some of the narrower propositions: that debts owed by colonists and the practices of British merchants were not primary causes of the revolution; and that the costs of the Navigation Acts' trade restrictions were small.4 Nonetheless, almost half of the economic historians believe that the economic burden of the British policies was "the spark" to the American Revolution.s Most who favor this position, however, do so with provisos. The bottom line is that there is no consensus on whether or not the economic burdens of British policies sparked the colonists' bid for independence.
At the beginning of the century, Charles Beard laid out the case for an economic interpretation of the making of the U.S. Constitution. Among other things, he argued that the personal economic interests of delegates to the Constitutional Convention had a significant effect on their actions in writing the Constitution.6 Although historians are divided on the question, the consensus among economists in the EHA is that this proposition is correct. (Of course, this does not necessarily imply an agreement with Beard's more particular claims about which personal interests mattered and how they mattered.) ANTEBELLUM 
PERIOD
Consensus exists on the two propositions concerning antebellum trade. Most agree with Douglass North's position that during the early national and antebellum period, export trade, particularly in cotton, was of prime importance as a stimulant to the economy.7 Likewise, most agree that antebellum tariffs harmed the southern states and benefited the northern states.8 In both cases, however, a considerable number would add provisos to these statements.
There is substantial disagreement with the proposition that nineteenth-century U.S. land policy probably represented a net drain on the productive capacity of the country. Terry Anderson and Peter Hill have recently restated this proposition, pointing out that the opportunity cost of squatting (queuing) is high because it removes productive resources from their most valuable use.9 Evidently, those surveyed do not buy (or are unaware of) this logic.
There is divided opinion on the two questions concerning industrial- The survey's four propositions about slavery come straight out of Time on the Cross.13 Two of them prove to be noncontroversial and were probably already widely accepted when Fogel and Engerman restated them. There is near unanimity that slavery was not a system irrationally kept in existence by plantation owners and that the slave system was not economically moribund on the eve of the Civil War.
One of the most contested issues in the debate has been Fogel and Engerman's proposition that slave agriculture was efficient compared with free agriculture. Economies of scale, effective management, and intensive utilization of labor and capital made southern slave agriculture considerably more efficient than nonslave southern farming. Apparently Although the traditional Keynesian explanation holds the edge in the first two questions, there is a consensus among both groups that "throughout the contractionary period of the Great Depression, the Federal Reserve had ample powers to cut short the process of monetary deflation and banking collapse. Proper action would have eased the severity of the contraction and very likely would have brought it to an end at a much earlier date."31 However, most supporters of this position require that unnamed provisos be added before the contention is fully accepted.
Finally, economic historians are sharply divided over the traditional Keynesian alternative explanation of the depression that a fall in autonomous spending, particularly investment, is the primary explanation for the onset of the Great Depression.32 About 40 percent of economists and 50 percent of historians disagree with the hypothesis: only about one-fifth accept it without provisos. 27 Although the central causes of the depression are still hotly contested, there is a consensus that the "passage of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff exacerbated the Great Depression."34 Vice President Albert Gore's assertion (in his NAFTA debate with H. Ross Perot) of our consensus on this issue, has been corroborated.
On top of the profession's lack of agreement about the genesis of the Great Depression, there is a disagreement about the effect of the New Deal. In fact, the economists in the sample are almost evenly divided on the question of whether or not when taken "as a whole, government policies of the New Deal served to lengthen and deepen the Great Depression." The consensus among historians is that the new Deal did not lengthen and deepen the depression.
The final debate addressed in the survey concerns the cyclical volatility of the economy before and after the Great Depression. Christina Romer has argued that earlier studies overstated the pre-Great Depression volatility of the economy. Her findings generated a flurry of research and rethinking on the issue.35 The current consensus is that the volatility of GNP and unemployment were greater before the Great Depression than they have been since the end of World War II.
CONCLUSIONS
The results of the survey can be very useful in the classroom. The findings go farther than textbooks in helping students get a sense of the collective wisdom of economic historians and emphasize that economic history like both its parents, economics and history, is full of unsettled debates.
The results can also guide the research agenda of economic historians. Some scholars will find that their beliefs run against the prevailing consensus. This need not mean that their beliefs are incorrect. Each one of us probably disagrees with one or more of the consensuses shown in Table 1 . Those holding minority views may wish to re-evaluate their position or to redouble their efforts to convince their colleagues by restating their case or pursuing additional research. 33 However, see Romer, "Nation." 34 See for example, Fearon, War, p. 129. 3S Romer, "New Estimates." See also, Weir, "Reliability."
